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Abstract: Monahan offers a critique of an agonistic interpretation of Hegelian
recognition as exclusively manifested by and through struggle, drawing out
Hegel's positive accounts of alternative manifestations of recognition.
Furthermore, he argues that getting Hegel right on recognition actually opens
up fertile theoretical ground for laying out positive accounts of human
freedom and liberation.

Hegelian recognition is often criticized as an inadequate tool for
theorizing human liberation. More and more, theorists of oppression
and liberation (feminists, race theorists, queer theorists, and so on)
are either rejecting recognition outright, or offering radical
reinterpretations of a concept they understand to be too focused upon
antagonistic struggle, and modeled upon the relations of dominance
and subordination found in the familiar "Master/Slave dialectic." By
way of a recent, and important, example, Kelly Oliver's book
Witnessing: Beyond Recognition makes an excellent case for a
liberatory feminist politics that transcends this agonistic (and
patriarchal) model of human agency most often associated with
Hegelian recognition.1 While much of her critique of this interpretation
of recognition (which I will here refer to as the "agonistic"
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interpretation) is constructive and fruitful, it should be noted that it is
predicated upon a very narrow, and in my view inaccurate,
understanding of Hegel's own account of the phenomenon. In other
words, Oliver's criticism of this account of recognition is compelling
and persuasive, but it is by no means clear that the agonistic account
she offers can be rightly understood as accurately capturing Hegel's
own understanding.
While Hegel does devote a great deal of text to discussion of the
ways in which recognition may be made manifest through struggle,
where such interpretations (and those critiques based upon them) fail
is in their presumption that struggle is the exclusive means of gaining
recognition, and that recognition predicated upon domination is a
normative paradigm. Hegel did indeed argue that struggle for
recognition could be important, and that it was without doubt
common, but he took great care to point towards ways and means
whereby recognition, as a necessary condition for human freedom
(and thus liberation), could be gained and maintained without the
need for struggle. In other words, there is an understanding of
recognition beyond struggle that Hegel explicitly describes and
endorses. To reject recognition entirely on the grounds that it is overly
agonistic is to throw out the baby with the proverbial bathwater. This
is not merely because it is, in itself, an inaccurate reading of Hegelian
recognition. My purpose in this paper is twofold. First, I will offer a
critique of this agonistic interpretation of Hegelian recognition as
exclusively manifested by and through struggle, drawing out Hegel's
positive accounts of alternative manifestations of recognition. Second,
my ultimate goal is not simply to "correct" a common misreading of
Hegel, but to argue that getting Hegel right on recognition actually
opens up fertile theoretical ground for laying out positive accounts of
human freedom and liberation.
The agonistic interpretation of recognition is by no means
unique to Oliver. It dominates feminist theory,2 race theory,3 and
much of twentieth century continental philosophy.4 In fact, the vast
majority of literature concerned with oppression and liberation
presumes that the agonistic view of recognition as struggle is both an
accurate and-more importantly for my purposes―complete
interpretation of Hegelian recognition. There is, in this literature, a
myopic focus on the passages from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 32, No. 3 (July 2006): pg. 389-414. Publisher Link. This article is © Florida State University
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Florida State University does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Florida State University.

2

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

dealing with the "Master/Slave dialectic" and the life-and-death
struggle. The theory of recognition that results from this narrow focus
is surely worthy of criticism, but it is also woefully incomplete. My
reason for focusing on Oliver's work is not merely because her work is
representative of this dominant interpretation of Hegel within the
literature of oppression and liberation, but also because she offers
such a compelling critique of this agonistic reading of recognition.
Oliver argues convincingly that a commitment to genuinely liberatory
theory demands a rejection of the agonistic interpretation of Hegelian
recognition. That being said, her critique of recognition is impoverished
to the extent that it omits any reference to what Hegel himself
referred to as pure recognition ("Dieser reine Begriff des
Anerkennens"),5 while at the same time treating the agonistic
interpretation as if it were complete. There are plenty of excellent
reasons to be critical of Hegel from the perspective of gender and race
theory, but his theory of recognition, as such, is not one of them.

The Agonistic Interpretation: "Corrupted"
Recognition
According to the view I have been referring to as "agonistic,"
recognition is achieved through a process of struggle, subordination,
and domination. In this view, the world is full of agents seeking to
extract recognition from other agents. Since, as Oliver describes it,
recognition requires a recognizer and a recognizee,6 many agents are
bound to have their efforts thwarted, or at least resisted. Thus, in
order to extract recognition from another, it becomes necessary to
engage in a life and death struggle―one must compel recognition from
the other, who, because the bestowing of such recognition is
understood to constitute a kind of loss of status, will resist this
compulsion. The ensuing struggle must result either in the death of
one of the combatants, in which case there can be no recognition
(because the dead are incapable of it), or one of the combatants must
submit to and thereby recognize the other, who becomes master to
the other's slave. This in turn establishes a relationship of dominance
and subordination, an account of which is provided in Hegel's dialectic
of Master and Slave.
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There are four central tenets of the agonistic interpretation of
Hegelian recognition. First, recognition, as a phenomenon, requires the
participants to occupy one of two distinct roles―recognizer, or
recognizee. There is always one (or more than one) who is recognizing
another (or group of others), and one (or more than one) who is being
recognized by another (or group of others). Recognition is thus always
already a relation of asymmetry. Second, this asymmetry results in
relations of superiority and inferiority. The one who is recognized (the
recognizee) is thereby placed in a position of dominance vis-à-vis the
recognizer, who in turn is subordinated through the act of recognition.
This is simply because one of the participants is having his or her
status as a fully human subject acknowledged, while the other is not.
This can perhaps be most clearly seen in terms of the recognition of
full political status. If group A is recognized by group B as having full
political rights and privileges without being themselves so recognized,
then group A will be in a position of political superiority. This in turn
points toward the third central tenet, which holds that agents will tend
to resist being placed in the subordinate position in relations of
recognition (for what should be obvious reasons). Given that we are all
seeking recognition, but are loathe to simply give it, it follows that
others must be compelled to grant recognition, which results in a
normative state of struggle. This is the fourth and last central claim of
the agonistic view. If one's only two choices are domination or
subordination, one will typically choose domination.7 If domination is
only achieved through the forcible extraction of recognition from some
other, then one's efforts must be directed toward that forcible
extraction. In this way, struggle becomes the foundation for
recognition as such.
Recognition must therefore be understood, in Oliver's terms, as
"pathological,"8 inasmuch as it fosters relations of domination and
oppression. According to Oliver, "[c]omparison and domination are
thus inherent in the recognition model of identity, a model that helps
to maintain oppression and colonialism on a psychological level."9 This
is because
[w]ithin the pathology of recognition, subjectivity is conferred
by those in power and on those they deem powerless and
disempowered ... It is the desire to become objectified in order
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to be recognized by the sovereign subject to whom the
oppressed is beholden for his or her own self-worth.10
It is easy to see how, within this agonistic view, one might hold that
"Hegel portrays human consciousness as shaped primarily by
domination, subordination, and death."11 With all of this in mind, it is
not in the least surprising that recognition should be subjected to
constant critique from those theorists interested in issues of
oppression and liberation. What I am arguing here, however, is that
this critique of recognition as overtly agonistic misses the mark, since
the object of the critique is not really recognition per se, but rather a
particular form of it, and a corrupted one at that.12
The dominance of the agonistic interpretation of Hegelian
recognition has its roots, I submit, in the myopic focus on the dialectic
of Master/ Slave found in most twentieth-century interpretations of
Hegel. Hegelian recognition, in other words, seems to be reduced, on
most accounts, to the Master/Slave dialectic, without any effort to
contextualize that dialectic or differentiate it from Hegel's treatment of
recognition as a whole. Fortunately, recent Hegel scholarship has done
much to undermine this view, and what follows owes a great debt to
the work of Axel Honneth and Robert Williams in particular.13 What
these more recent works on Hegel's account of recognition have shown
is that the agonistic view elides any reference to pure recognition.14 It
may be (and very likely is) the case that what I am here referring to
as "corrupted" forms of recognition better describe actual human
interaction as it is presently made manifest, but, especially for Hegel,
that is only contingently true. That we find ourselves more frequently
engaging in relations of corrupted, rather than pure, recognition, is a
result of a failure to achieve those conditions, both individual and
social, that are conducive to pure recognition, rather than some
necessary moment in the development of human consciousness. This
is not to say that pure and corrupted recognition are radically distinct
concepts, either. Indeed, my choice to appeal to the terminology of
corruption is intended not only to maintain consistency with Hegel's
own use of "purity," but also to make clear the ways in which the pure
and corrupted thing or phenomenon remains at root the same thing or
phenomenon. What I am calling "corrupted" recognition is still a
manifestation of recognition, it just has yet to reach its full potential. It
is, in other words, only a suggestion of what it could become.15
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Bearing these points in mind not only offers one a more accurate
interpretation of Hegel, but also opens up a completely different
approach to questions of oppression and liberation, which I shall
discuss further below. Pure recognition offers an ideal for human
interaction that both preserves the valuable insights the agonistic
interpretation offers and at the same time answers the critique leveled
against it, all the while pointing toward future directions of positive
theoretical development as regards oppression and liberation.
Before any account of pure recognition can get under way,
however, it is necessary to make an important interpretive point.
Hegel's Phenomenology is often read as a rather linear narrative of the
development of "Spirit" (Geist). Judith Butler, for example, refers to
the Phenomenology as a kind of "Bildungsroman, an optimistic
narrative of adventure and edification, a pilgrimage of the spirit."16 I
do not deny that this can be an instructive way to approach the text,
but it is not without its weaknesses, either. Foremost, it misses the
extent to which Hegel takes himself not to be building a conception of
"absolute spirit" from disparate parts, but rather revealing a totality
that was present, if only implicitly, in those parts all along. The
structural order of the text, therefore, should not be understood as an
instruction manual laying out the necessary steps that each
consciousness must undergo in order to eventually cross a spiritual
finish line. According to Philip Kain:
This is crucially important because many readers assume that
the Phenomenology proceeds by necessary logical deduction,
that each successive stage is logically derived from what
precedes ... Readers notoriously are unable to see the necessity
involved in moving from one form of consciousness to the next.
This perplexity arises, in my view, from mistakenly assuming
that each stage is supposed to be logically deduced from the
preceding.17
And later:
What has to be done is to show that each stage fails. But
nothing specific necessarily follows from that failure-certainly
the next stage is not logically deduced ... It is we who make the
leap to the next stage in order to overcome the inadequacies of
the preceding stages. There is no problem with transitions from
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stage to stage. Hegel strategically thinks up the next stage
himself.18
In short, the "story" of the Phenomenology ought not be read
exclusively as a sort of prescriptive narrative. This in turn means that
the dialectic of master and slave should be read as an illustration of a
larger point about the structure of intersubjective relations, and not as
a paradigm for human interaction.
With this claim about the interpretive approach to the
Phenomenology in mind, we are now equipped to grapple with the role
of recognition (both pure and corrupted) in the Hegelian system.

Pure Recognition
In the moment of Desire, from which Hegel's discussion of
recognition in the Phenomenology emerges, the agent is motivated by
an urge to demonstrate that she is a "simple universal,"19 in that she
takes herself to be complete, self-contained, and self-sufficient. She
confronts a world of merely contingent, inessential objects, and
understands herself to be the sole manifestation of necessity and
independence. To maintain this belief, agents in the moment of Desire
must engage in a constant process of negation. If I am to preserve my
position as pure, unfettered subjectivity, then I must negate all
external obstacles, usually by consuming or destroying them.20 In so
doing, I demonstrate their dependence upon my whim for their
continued existence. Thus, if I am to maintain my "selfcertainty" in the
moment of Desire, I must involve myself in a constant effort to
vanquish or destroy anything that might present itself as an object
independent of my own consciousness.21
All of this may appear rather abstract and esoteric, and certainly
Hegel's prose style does nothing to mitigate this appearance, but in
fact this approach to the world is all too common. Hegel's own use of
the concept of simplicity in his term "simple universal" is in fact rather
helpful here, for it points to the sense in which the moment of Desire
seeks a lack of complications. If my consciousness exists at the end of
the day in a manner that is related to, dependent upon, or otherwise
"embedded" within social, material, and/or historical circumstances
and contexts, then my subjectivity becomes convoluted rather quickly.
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I can attempt to avoid this complexity by demonstrating that these
"external" factors are in fact completely distinct from my agency,22 and
furthermore, subordinate to it. By negating difference, I maintain the
illusion of my own complete self-sufficiency. The moment of Desire, in
other words, is a manifestation of the belief that one is, effectively, the
only subject on the scene. An agent manifesting this moment of
consciousness will view the rest of the world, including the people in it,
either as tools for his own use, or obstacles to be overcome. And in
crushing those obstacles, or employing those tools, he demonstrates
to himself that he alone is possessed of true subjectivity and agency.
He becomes the lone active agent in a world of passive objects.
The moment of Desire serves as a perfect example of the
interpretive point made at the end of the previous section. It is a
moment not simply in the chronological sense, but more importantly in
the sense that it is a mode of consciousness that one may be
manifesting, may have once manifested, may manifest in the future,
or may be able to incorporate into one's consciousness without having
to necessarily experience it first hand at all. What is important about
the moment of Desire in the Phenomenology is that the reader grasp
the internal contradiction that, according to Hegel, inevitably flows
from it. This contradiction emerges from the simple fact that each
effort to demonstrate one's status as "simple universal" by negating
some object is itself a proof that there are independent objects. If
there really were no independent objects, if I really were the source of
all that is, then I wouldn't need to swagger about consuming or
destroying all that crossed my path. Furthermore, even if this weren't
the case, the "independence" gained in the act of negation is itself
dependent upon never-ending reiterations of that act. The moment I
stop consuming or annihilating, I am admitting defeat―I am allowing
independence to external objects. One could understand the very
nomenclature as indicative of the self-defeating nature of this moment
of consciousness. It is "Desire" precisely because it can never be
satiated. Desire seeks what can never be, but what it dimly perceives
must be. It seeks a status ("simple universal") that is ultimately only a
caricature of what Hegel believes to be the truth of human
consciousness. It is in the realization of the ultimate futility of Desire,
for Hegel, that we come to realize the need for an encounter with
another consciousness.
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Before I spell this out, a more mundane example is in order. To
be sure, very few individuals, if any, will fully manifest the moment of
Desire as Hegel describes it in the Phenomenology. But elements of
this mode of consciousness are not at all uncommon. At its root, the
moment of Desire is a drive to inhabit a world in which nothing can
rise up to challenge one's subjectivity. In the moment of Desire, I seek
to demonstrate that nothing is capable of thwarting my will―that I am
the only agent in the world worth the name. Consider, by way of
example, someone who is deeply committed to the ideal of the
"rugged individualist" in a manner that is as much John Galt as it is
John Wayne. The individualist, let us call her Ann, will surely not
destroy everything and everyone around her merely on whim, but she
seeks to become as "self-sufficient" and "independent" as possible.
She will psychologically, and perhaps even physically, distance herself
as much as she can from the "outside" world, seeking to situate
herself such that she need never rely on anyone else. To do otherwise
she takes to be a sign of weakness. On one extreme, this might mean
acquiring the skills and knowledge necessary to survive on her own in
the wilderness, "living off the land" and "fending for herself." On the
other extreme, it might mean that Ann will seek to acquire enough
wealth that she need never concern herself with her own physical
needs (that's what good servants are for) or the social world (that's
what good legal and administrative staff are for). Either way, Ann is
setting herself up as a "simple universal." Other individuals, social
bodies, material objects, and the natural world exist only as tools or
obstacles to be mastered, overcome, or at the very least, ignored. She
does whatever she can to prove to herself that she is in complete
control of her life, that nothing is left to chance (or worse, to the will of
others), and that nothing intrudes upon her world except by her
consent. Ann's life becomes organized around this constant effort to
assert her complete independence.
While this is an admittedly extreme example of individual
behavior, it in fact appeals to ideals that dominate much of the North
American cultural and ideological landscape. The "self-made-man," the
captain of industry, and the romantic loner carving out a solo
existence in the American wilderness all appeal to this notion of
perfect self-sufficiency. This example is instructive not simply because
there may or may not be individuals that manifest this extreme
version of the moment of Desire, but because these elements of the
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moment of Desire, as they exist in these iconic cultural tropes, are so
common and influential. Desire, therefore, is not only some discrete
moment of our own consciousness that we must confront and then
leave behind, it is something that deeply informs our understanding of
ourselves and our world on a cultural level.23 We are thus confronting
it constantly, and, according to Hegel, a firm grasp of its internal
contradictions can only aid us in avoiding its more pernicious
consequences.
Remember that what the agent seeks in the moment of Desire
is a kind of affirmation of her own subjectivity. She wants proof that
she exists as a subject able to exert her will over the world around
her. But, as we have seen, the modus operandi of Desire cannot
satisfy this need for proof and certainty. For Hegel, only pure
recognition is able to provide this affirmation of agency that each
subject needs in order to fully develop. The problem with the moment
of Desire lies not merely in its method, but in the conception of agency
that informs it. For Hegel, we can never be the "simple universal"
posited in the moment of Desire, for human being means existing both
as universal and particular.24 The moment of Desire seeks to eliminate
all particularity. The agent in the moment of Desire is seeking to
overcome his history, his culture, his social standing, the physical and
human obstacles in his way, and so on. That is, he seeks to annihilate
all particularity from his existence. What recognition provides is a way
to bridge this gap between universality and particularity within the
consciousness of the agent, by allowing the agent to experience
herself both as a situated, particular object enmeshed in a
sophisticated system of other objects and forces, as well as being an
independent consciousness capable of acting on this larger system of
objects and forces in a way that generates new and different
possibilities of further action and self-expression.
In pure recognition, the agent is able to exist as a self-conscious
agent for another self-conscious agent, which means that the agent
exists for himself as both a subject and an object simultaneously. In
the Phenomenology, and many subsequent discussions of Hegelian
recognition, recognition is elaborated in the scope of an I/thou
encounter between two agents. This is clearly an instructive way to
think through recognition, but as I shall show later, a narrow focus on
this I/thou level can be very limiting, and even misleading. For the
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moment, however, using a two-agent example will prove most helpful
in fleshing out the differences between pure and corrupted recognition.
In order to keep this first example as straightforward as
possible, imagine two agents, Matt and Mary, who are about to engage
in pure recognition. Matt, in recognizing Mary, affirms openly that she
is another self-conscious agent like himself. This in turn means that
Matt recognizes that he is himself an object for Mary's
consciousness―he is an other for her, because she, like him, is
capable of consciously attending to the world around her. This is
important first because Matt is acknowledging their shared status as
subjects, and second because in order for Matt to realize that he is an
object of Mary's consciousness, he must exercise his own
subjectivity―he has to perform this realization that he is an object of
Mary's consciousness as an agent. In other words, Matt must manifest
his subjectivity in order to apprehend himself as an object for Mary.
Mary, meanwhile, is performing the same exercise in relation to Matt.
When both agents approach the other in this way, this means that
their self-consciousness is rendered explicit through this manifestation
of reciprocal (pure) recognition. If Matt recognizes Mary, who is in turn
recognizing him, then Matt has his own subjectivity "given" back to
him,25 but in a way that opens it up to a kind of public affirmation.
Matt apprehends another subject, who is, through her recognition of
him as himself a subject, showing him his own agency "in the world."
His status as a self-conscious agent becomes importantly real for him
in a way that was impossible without this reciprocal recognition.
It should be clear at this point that the manifestation of
recognition described above only works when both agents are willing
to fully recognize the other. In Hegel's words, "[a]ction by one side
only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought
about by both."26 It is in this necessity for reciprocity that the "purity"
of pure recognition lies. Without reciprocity, the full benefits of
recognition are lost to both parties. If Matt recognizes Mary, but she is
unwilling to recognize him, then he does not have his own status as an
agent rendered explicit, because Mary does not openly acknowledge
this status. At the same time. Mary cannot have her own subjectivity
made explicit, since she refuses to accept that Matt is a subject
capable of acknowledging her own subjectivity. According to Hegel, the
reciprocity of pure recognition is significant "because it is indivisibly
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the action of one as well as of the other."27 In pure recognition, in
other words, the agents "recognize themselves as mutually
recognizing one another."28 If one or both parties refuse to recognize
the other, then recognition becomes corrupted.
The account of pure recognition described above is contained
entirely in paragraphs 178-184 of the Phenomenology. Paragraph 185
serves as a transition between pure and corrupted recognition, and is
worth quoting in its entirety:
We have now to see how the process of this pure Notion of
recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its
oneness, appears to self-consciousness. At first, it will exhibit
the side of the inequality of the two, or the splitting-up of the
middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed
to one another, one being only recognized, the other only
recognizing.29
Thus, what preceded paragraph 185 was an account of reciprocal, pure
recognition, and what follows it is only an account of the dialectic of
recognition in an impure form. Thus, "this pure Notion of recognition,"
only "appears," "at first," in the form of these two extremes (Master
and Slave), but this is mere appearance, and should not be properly
understood as a normative account of recognition as such. As I shall
argue later, what is described in the Master/Slave dialectic is still
recognition, but it is far from pure, and thus not meant to be a model
upon which to base our own actions. What is more, this "at first"
pertains to the development of consciousness in general, not
necessarily to the chronology of development for a given individual.
The exclusive focus on the Master/Slave dialectic that so
dominates appropriations of Hegel in the philosophy of oppression and
liberation, therefore, leaves out a fundamental aspect of Hegelian
recognition. Without pure recognition, we are indeed left with a picture
of recognition that is thoroughly agonistic. But what should be
apparent at this point is that any treatment of Hegelian recognition
that works with this exclusive focus upon the Master/Slave dialectic is
actually a treatment of Hegelian misrecognition, insofar as it takes
corrupted recognition to be the norm. As a consequence, any critique
of "Hegelian Recognition" that focuses upon this agonistic paradigm
misses its target. Hegel would, in fact, agree that the Master/Slave
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dialectic is far from ideal, that the "life and death struggle" is
unnecessarily destructive, and that relations of domination and
subordination are dehumanizing and contrary to human freedom.
These are all ways in which, according to Hegel, we manifest a
corrupted form of that which is ideal, which is constructive, and which
is conducive (indeed, necessary) to human freedom―pure recognition.
Oliver raises the subject of "misrecognition," but points out that
"insofar as misrecognition presupposes an ideal recognition we are still
operating within an economy of recognition." She goes on to argue
that while misrecognition "is very effective in explaining the existence
of war and oppression, if normalized it makes it impossible to imagine
peaceful compassionate relations with others across or through
differences."30 There are two important responses to this claim. First,
when Oliver refers to an "economy of recognition," she is in fact
referring to an economy of corrupted recognition, inasmuch as she
treats the Master/Slave dialectic, and the agonistic model, as the
paradigms of Hegelian recognition. Thus, she is correct in claiming that
the normalization of that model would make it impossible to conceive
of anything other than fundamentally agonistic relations between
human beings, but my claim is that Hegel would agree with this. The
purpose of the Master/Slave dialectic is to point out a way in which we
can fail to manifest the ideal of pure recognition, and to reveal the
pitfalls, and eventual resolution, of this particular detour from our
"proper" path. Her rejection of "misrecognition," therefore, is
unfounded.
The second important response has to do with our
understanding of when recognition is present. Hegel's term "pure"
(reine) in his own account connotes an ideal that admits of degrees of
realization. If we add water to a glass of pure alcohol, we do not then
deny that there is alcohol in the glass. The glass of alcohol is now
merely impure. The same would apply to descriptions of recognition.
Manifestations of recognition that fail to be fully pure are still
manifestations of recognition, inasmuch as they are manifestations of
intersubjectivity. This is clear for the slave, who, in recognizing the
master, has already begun to move beyond the solipsistic moment of
Desire, but it is also true for the Master. According to Hegel, "The lord
relates himself mediately to the bondsman through a being [a thing]
that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in
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bondage."31 It is not so much that the master refuses to recognize the
slave as it is that the master refuses to recognize the slave as a full
agent like the master. There is thus a rudimentary recognition even in
this prime example of the corruption of recognition.
Thus, Oliver is correct to point out that "misrecognition" is still
recognition. However, returning to my example, there is a real
difference between pure and impure alcohol. They will behave
differently when exposed to open flame, for instance, they have
different density, and they affect the human body differently if
consumed. In the same way, there is a real difference between pure
and impure recognition. To point out that they are both manifestations
of the same basic phenomenon does not mean that they are equally
valuable, or that they function in the same way, or that they have the
same impact on the participants. Conversely, to understand corrupted
recognition as if it were not recognition at all would create a radical
distinction between pure recognition on the one hand, and an utter
lack of recognition on the other. Reciprocity would then be not an
alteration (though an important one) of an already existing relation,
but the emergence of a completely new and distinct relation. By
maintaining the ultimate similarity of pure and corrupted recognition,
the transition from corruption to purity becomes less opaque-it is a
matter of shaping what already exists into a more ideal form. Pure
recognition is qualitatively distinct from impure recognition, even if
they are at root different manifestations of the same phenomenon.
Oliver is, of course, quite right to reject the norm that she
describes. Recognition that is conferred upon a subordinate by one in a
dominant position is far from liberating, and to seek to have this
recognition conferred upon oneself by a superior is surely pathological.
Frantz Fanon makes this point explicitly in his discussion of Hegel in
Black Skin, White Masks, a text that Oliver appeals to in her own work.
It is worth quoting Fanon at length:
There is not an open conflict between white and black.
One day the White Master, without conflict, recognized the
Negro slave.
But the former slave wants to make himself recognized.
At the foundation of Hegelian dialectic there is an absolute
reciprocity which must be emphasized. It is in the degree to
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which I go beyond my own immediate being that I apprehend
the existence of the other as a natural and more than natural
reality. If I close the circuit, if I prevent the accomplishment of
movement in two directions, I keep the other within himself.
Ultimately, I deprive him even of this being-for-itself.
The only means of breaking this vicious circle that throws
me back on myself is to restore to the other, through mediation
and recognition, his human reality, which is different from
natural reality. The other has to perform the same operation.32
What is crucial about this passage is the way in which Fanon is
explicitly referring to pure recognition as a remedy for dominance and
subordination. Indeed, immediately after the section above, he directly
quotes Hegel's claims that recognition must be reciprocal in
paragraphs 182 and 184 of the Phenomenology. Fanon later offers
some very stimulating criticisms of the application of Hegelian
recognition within a racist/ colonial context, but it is clear that he does
not simply reduce his understanding of recognition to an agonistic one.
It is a serious mistake to reduce Hegelian recognition as such to the
agonistic and oppressive model offered in the Master/Slave dialectic,
and both Hegel and Fanon realized this.
A full account of Hegelian recognition, even one drawn only from
the Phenomenology, is inconsistent with the agonistic interpretation.
What is more, the critiques of recognition that prove so telling against
the agonistic interpretation are not tenable when turned on an account
that incorporates pure recognition. Hegel deserves to be criticized for
his treatment of women and non-whites in his discussions of history,
anthropology, and the family. The critiques of recognition offered by
those who hold to the agonistic interpretation, however, have thus far
missed the mark.

The Uses and Abuses of Recognition
While it should be clear at this point that the agonistic model of
Hegelian recognition is based upon a misinterpretation of the role of
recognition in the Phenomenology, it remains to be seen how
correcting this interpretive error will yield any benefits for theorists
interested in addressing issues of oppression and domination. In order
to make this case fully, it will be necessary to move beyond the
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Phenomenology and look closely at Hegel's treatment of recognition
both in the Philosophy of Mind and the Philosophy of Right.
It is the reciprocal nature of pure recognition which is key for
understanding the role it plays, according to Hegel, in human freedom.
Recall that the function of recognition is to provide a manifestation of
one's own agency (subjectivity) in the world, by having it "given back"
(or affirmed)33 by another consciousness. For Hegel, what is
essentially being affirmed in such cases is the freedom of oneself, and
the other. In discussing recognition in the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel
makes this explicit:
Only in such a manner [pure recognition] is true freedom
realized; for since this consists in my identity with the other, I
am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized
by me as free. This freedom of one in the other unites men in
an inward manner, whereas needs and necessity bring them
together only externally. Therefore, men must will to find
themselves again in one another.34
In short, only a free subject can truly recognize and affirm my own
freedom.35 According to Hegel, if I coerce recognition it is immediately
corrupted, and the truth of my freedom remains obscured. This is why
Hegel goes on in this same paragraph to discuss the importance of
struggle and the risking of one's life for freedom. Indeed, as we shall
see, according to Hegel, true freedom for one demands the freedom of
all. In order to grasp this particular argument, however, three further
general points need to be made.
First, some further discussion of the role of struggle and the
staking of one's life in Hegelian recognition is warranted. This is,
clearly, one of the cornerstones of the agonistic account of recognition,
and there is, to be sure, ample textual evidence to support the fact
that Hegel took struggle to be quite important. But again, this textual
evidence needs to be placed within its proper context. First and
foremost, Hegel makes it clear in the Philosophy of Mind that he does
not intend struggle and conflict to be the norm:
To prevent any possible misunderstandings with regard to the
standpoint just outlined [life and death struggle for recognition],
we must here remark that the fight for recognition pushed to
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the extreme here indicated can only occur in the natural state,
where men exist only as single, separate individuals; but it is
absent in civil society and the State because here the
recognition for which the combatants fought already exists.36
It should be kept in mind here that "civil society" and the "State" refer
to ideal (Real in Hegel's terminology) manifestations, and not
necessarily to presently existing (Actual) ones. Recall also that the
Master/Slave dialectic and the account of the life and death struggle
for recognition are both "just-so" stories designed to make certain
points about the nature and development of human consciousness.
They are in many ways analogous to the Rawlsian "original
position"―they are useful fictions designed to facilitate certain kinds of
theoretical maneuvering. If it were truly necessary for every agent to
engage in a life or death struggle with every other agent, then the
Hegelian world would share many unsavory characteristics of the
Hobbesian state of nature (especially nastiness, brutishness, and
brevity).
The reason why the life and death struggle is important, for
Hegel, is because it is through the staking of one's life that one asserts
one's commitment to values and causes that transcend immediate
physical existence.37 This is not an endorsement of some form of
mind/body dualism (indeed, Hegel is highly critical of any such
distinction). Hegel is not urging us to reject our status as physical
beings. The point is rather that we make explicit, through our
willingness to risk our very existence, our commitment to something
beyond ourselves. Part of the wrong of the corrupted recognition made
manifest in the dialectic of Master and Slave is that the master
attempts to reduce the slave to a purely physical object―a physical
extension of the will of the master. The choice to risk one's life to alter
this condition is in itself a rejection of that "objectification." In the
"natural state" that Hegel references in the passage quoted above, this
will require direct physical confrontation with another, but within a
more sophisticated social setting, one's status as a subject can be built
in to the practices, mores, and institutions within which one is so
deeply enmeshed. In such a setting, literal life and death struggle can
become no longer necessary, though of course, it is also possible to
have corrupted recognition "built in" to one's social environment,
which leads to the second general point.
Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 32, No. 3 (July 2006): pg. 389-414. Publisher Link. This article is © Florida State University
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Florida State University does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Florida State University.

17

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

In both the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Mind,
Hegel's discussions of recognition tend to focus on a two-agent, I/thou
model. This has clear advantages in terms of exposition, but a
reduction of recognition to this two-person norm can be very
misleading. Real people in the real world do not wallow in the
solipsistic excesses of the moment of Desire, only to at long last
encounter another lone consciousness, and engage in a life or death
struggle. We come into the world deeply enmeshed in a complex and
sophisticated web of linguistic, cultural, religious, and institutional
norms and practices that condition the ways and means whereby we
interact with others, who are themselves likewise situated. We quite
literally find ourselves in a series of situations in which we are able to
experience and manifest relationships with varying degrees of
reciprocity (purity). Gender, race, class, sexuality, and myriad other
variables condition the possibilities of interaction with other individuals
and institutions. While this opens up massive possibilities for
corrupting recognition, it is also crucial to understanding the function
of recognition in Hegel's politics―the cornerstone of which is his
concept of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeif).
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes Ethical Life as
composed of the family, "civil society," and the state. These are
interdependent facets that work together to provide ways and means
whereby agents can interact with other agents and institutions in what
Hegel hopes will be constructive ways. Ethical Life, put simply, is the
larger social context in which all agents find themselves embedded. It
both provides the ground upon which we are able to interact
(language, custom, law, and so on), as well as conditioning that
interaction-such that it either fosters or hinders manifestations of pure
recognition. As the passage quoted above from the Philosophy of Mind
makes clear, recognition is, for Hegel, ultimately directed toward
freedom. The same holds for Ethical Life. As he states, "Ethical Life is
accordingly the concept of freedom which has become the existing
[vorhandenen] world and the nature of self-consciousness."38 Ethical
Life, therefore, may be understood in part as the ways in which
recognition (both pure and corrupted) becomes ossified and rendered
concrete through our "normalized" social practices and ways of
interacting. When the manifestations of recognition found in the
institutions39 and practices of Ethical Life are corrupted, then the
recognition I am able to manifest will more likely be corrupted, and
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vice-versa. The key to realizing human freedom, therefore, is not
constant struggle or perpetual reiterations of the master/slave
dialectic, but rather the formation of the kind of social world in which
pure recognition is fostered as the norm of human interaction. It may
very well involve (political and individual) struggle to achieve this end,
but this is a far cry from the visions of gladiatorial bloodsport that tend
to dominate the agonistic paradigm of Hegelian recognition.
The third and final general point to be made has to do with the
treatment of recognition as a static state of being. Recognition, both
pure and impure, must be understood as an always incomplete
process, and not as something one accomplishes in any final way. It is
not a static state, but a manifestation of a continuous process. Far
from being a discrete event or task, recognition must be an ongoing
effort to reveal what for Hegel is the underlying truth of human
interaction. It therefore requires constant maintenance, critical
reappraisal, and reaffirmation. Even on the more simplistic I/thou
level, the moment one party decides that he is "finished" with the
other, reciprocal recognition is lost, and the two agents will either part
ways completely or begin to manifest some more or less corrupt form
of recognition. If we begin to take into account our social being, things
become rapidly more complex. One's ability to manifest pure
recognition with any given agent will be conditioned and influenced by
one's relations with other agents. And if we furthermore begin to take
into account the formal and informal institutions and practices that
make up the "substance" of Ethical Life, yet further levels of
complexity emerge. Put as simply as I am able, the point is that, in
order to really take seriously the freedom and agency of another, one
needs to understand that that freedom and agency are themselves
undergoing constant revision. If I ever take myself to have a complete
grasp of another, so that I have "recognized" him fully, then I have
already taken a step toward dehumanizing him by treating him as a
"dead" object, rather than as a living, changing, subject. Thus, even
corrupted recognition cannot be "granted" or "conferred," because it is
not a thing or a static state of being. Recognition of any type requires
constant nurturing and maintenance. Even the most oppressive
manifestation of corrupted recognition will not simply continue on its
own.
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Pure recognition, I have argued, is a necessary component of
any full appreciation of Hegelian recognition. What I have referred to
as the "agonistic interpretation" not only maintains a narrow focus on
the Master/Slave dialectic and the life and death struggle, it
completely elides our status as socially embedded agents and the role
of Ethical Life. Once these factors are addressed, the picture of
Hegelian recognition that emerges is markedly different from that
offered in much of the current literature on oppression and
domination, in which the agonistic interpretation is hegemonic. It
remains to be shown, however, that the interpretation of Hegelian
recognition that I am offering here will have anything constructive to
offer theorists of oppression and domination, and especially to show
that, for Hegel, the freedom of one demands the freedom of all.
It will be helpful at this point to have an example to which I can
appeal in the course of my argument. To be sure, there are myriad
real-life examples of deeply embedded misrecognition upon which I
could draw. Racism, sexism, classism, religious persecution, and any
number of other manifestations of oppression could be used quite
fruitfully. As much as I would normally prefer to use these actual
examples, they are incredibly complex phenomena, and a proper
treatment of them is not possible within this essay. Consequently, I
will have to use a more "stripped-down" example, and offer only the
occasional gesture toward linkages with these real-life phenomena.
That being said, consider a world in which there exist creatures
very much like us, except that some significant minority, who have
some clearly visible phenotypical difference from the rest of the
populace (suppose they have three eyes), occupy a social position of
power and privilege vis-à-vis everyone else. Three-eyed people (or
"threes" for short) have for generations occupied important leadership
positions in government, business, technology, science, media, and
education, and have used their accumulated power to both prevent
two-eyed people ("twos") from threatening their dominance, and to
convince the twos that their inferior position is a natural consequence
of their inherent inferiority as a separate species. Norms of behavior
and interaction dictate that all twos should treat all threes with
deference and respect, while threes may abuse, denigrate, or simply
ignore the existence of twos. The legal system presumes the inherent
criminality of twos and the inherent virtue of threes. The education
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system teaches that all historical progress is the result of the
exceptional talents of threes. Any two who complains about or resists
her "place" in the social order is seen as deviant, and dismissed as a
trouble-maker who is jealous of the "success" of others. Twos are
severely punished for looking threes directly in the eyes, while both
the content and methodology of education reinforces the intellectual
inferiority of twos, and so on. In short, this is a world in which
corrupted recognition is deeply embedded in the Ethical Life of this
society. It impacts the way individuals understand themselves as
individuals, how they understand themselves in relation to others, and
how they understand themselves in relation to the formal and informal
institutions of that Ethical Life.
The first important consequence of taking pure recognition
seriously is that it rules out reducing domination and oppression to the
individualistic I/thou level. To be sure, there are important ways in
which individual interactions manifest corrupted recognition, but this
should always be understood within a larger context that gives force
and meaning to those manifestations. The deepest impact on any
given individual's sense of self comes seldom from another individual,
and more often from the innumerable symbols, practices, and
institutions that serve as the medium in which those individual
interactions take place. In my admittedly simplistic example, a teacher
who is a three is able to successfully undermine the agency of his
pupils who are twos because there is an established history of the
legitimacy of this project, support and resources from the larger
institutions of education, and a deeply entrenched expectation on the
part of both teachers and students that this is what normal education
is. To see this simply as an evil individual harming innocent victims is
to vastly oversimplify this phenomenon, such that a disservice is done
to both parties.
What is more, recognition is manifest whenever there is more
than one subject. The important distinction is not between recognition
and lack of recognition, but between varying degrees of purity of
recognition. Hegel still refers to the Master/Slave dialectic as a
manifestation of recognition, it is just recognition gone wrong. In my
example, twos are recognized by threes, but they are misrecognized
as inherently inferior and worthy of domination. Since, for Hegel, we
come to know and understand ourselves through this interaction with
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others, it stands to reason that systematically corrupted recognition
can have a crippling impact on the first-person agency of those in the
subordinate position. This phenomenon of "mental colonialization"―the
idea that one can "internalize" damaging views and attitudes of those
who are in the dominant position―is a common theme in literature on
oppression, and the interpretation of Hegelian recognition I am
offering is well-equipped to provide an account of it. Hegelian
recognition allows for an account of oppression as a systemic
corruption of recognition that saturates not only the interactions of
individuals, but nearly every aspect of Ethical Life―the "concrete"
social context in which each individual finds herself embedded. It
provides an account of oppression and domination as a fundamentally
social phenomenon, but not a reductively social one. That is, it sees
the way in which larger social contexts and institutions condition
individual interactions (fostering more or less pure manifestations of
recognition on the individual level) without reducing oppression either
to variations in distribution of social goods or to simple discrimination.
Individuals still engage in and maintain oppression, but their actions
must be understood within that larger social context that gives their
individual actions force and meaning. Hegelian recognition, then, is a
way to bridge the divide between reductively atomistic accounts of
oppression on the one hand, reductively social/mechanical accounts on
the other.
Another advantage of this interpretation of Hegelian recognition
is that it provides a proper context in which to situate the role of
struggle in relation to human liberation. I have argued that the
agonistic interpretation's treatment of struggle as normative is an
overstatement of the role of struggle in recognition (and therefore
human freedom). But while it is a mistake to understand all human
interaction on the model of struggle, it is surely questionable (at best)
to think that liberation for the dominated and oppressed will emerge
without some kind of struggle. Fanon is surely correct in his claim that
genuine freedom cannot be simply bestowed upon one from without,
and thus some effort must be made on the part of the oppressed to
secure their freedom. In the agonistic interpretation, we struggle to
make the other grant us recognition. From the perspective of pure
recognition, however, the purpose of struggle is dramatically different.
If I compel recognition from another person, or a group or persons, or
an institution, then the recognition thereby made manifest will
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necessarily be corrupted, since pure recognition must be freely
undertaken by both parties. The recognition I receive from another
who I have forced to recognize me is not the recognition of another
free subject, and so cannot render concrete my own freedom through
that recognition. Thus, any "struggle for recognition" which is directed
toward compelling recognition can only ever truly be a struggle for
corrupted recognition. What one is seeking through struggle,
therefore, is not recognition as such, since a corrupted form of
recognition already exists, but rather one is seeking a more pure
manifestation of recognition. But what does this mean in practical
terms?
First and foremost, a struggle for purification of recognition
must be explicitly directed toward fostering reciprocity. This means
that the annihilation of the other is ruled out from the start, as are
such motives as vengeance or envy. Certainly one may struggle for
any of these purposes, but such struggles cannot be properly
understood as directed toward pure recognition. Indeed, a struggle to
annihilate the other may in certain circumstances be necessary for
survival, both on an individual level, and perhaps even on a larger
political level. The point is that such struggles, necessary and
important as they may be, should never be understood as struggles
for pure recognition. They may be struggles for survival, or for power,
but not reciprocity.
Genuine struggles for pure recognition perform two important
and interrelated functions. Returning to the example of the differentlyeyed peoples, we encounter a situation in which struggle will be an
important component of any liberatory effort. The oppression of the
twos by the threes is deeply entrenched both in formal and informal
institutions, such that many twos, and most threes, will see it as
normal and inevitable. The first important function of struggle will
have to do with the consciousness of the twos. If freedom emerges, as
Hegel believes, through pure recognition, then generations of deeply
entrenched misrecognition will cripple freedom. By resisting this
misrecognition, the twos are demonstrating to the threes, and equally
importantly, to themselves, that they are indeed full agents capable of
taking action to pursue human freedom. They thereby move from a
passive state in which they are acted upon by forces beyond their
control to an active one in which they gradually assume more and
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more control over the world around them, challenging what was
previously understood to be beyond question. Struggle for pure
recognition, then, should be understood as a means of building and
developing agency on the part of the oppressed and dominated.
The second function of struggle has to do with the
consciousness of the oppressors (in my example, the threes). The
struggle of the twos is directed practically toward changing the
material and social conditions that keep them "in their place." As we
have already seen, this also has the effect of demonstrating the
agency and subjectivity of the twos both to themselves and to the
threes. The ultimate function of struggle is to throw in the face of the
oppressors the reality of the status of the oppressed as fully human
agents. To be sure, many of the oppressors will resist this reality, by
attempting to ignore it, or by explaining it away, or by attempting to
crush those who resist their understanding of the world they inhabit.
The point of the struggle is to make these efforts to evade the
realization of the humanity of the oppressed as difficult as possible.
One cannot compel this realization, but one can create conditions in
which the usual means of avoidance become too cumbersome to
pursue.
What is more, these two functions are mutually reinforcing.
When I, as a two, participate in a political struggle against my position
as a second-class citizen, I immediately realize that I am disproving
the myth of the "natural" and "inevitable" status of my political
subordination. I am, for perhaps the first time, coming to terms with
the reality of my agency (this is what we mean when we refer to
"empowerment"). As the threes scramble to resist my efforts, they
make clear the extent to which my efforts are having a real impact.
They may not be fully successful in the practical sense, but by taking
action against me, the threes are implicitly acknowledging my efforts
(this is an example of how /misrecognition is still recognition).
Already, my agency is being made concrete to me through the actions
of others to crush it. Invigorated by this realization, I redouble my
efforts, and the threes must take even more elaborate measures to
resist my struggle. Simultaneously, when I, as a three, witness for the
first time the struggle of the twos, I am likewise made immediately, if
perhaps only implicitly, aware that my understanding of my dominance
as natural and inevitable is no longer obviously true. At first, it may be
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easy to ignore their efforts as the misguided antics of a few
troublemakers, or explain them away as the inevitable expression of
the inherently violent nature of twos, or simply unleash the full force
of the police on those rioters and vandals. As the struggle persists and
grows, however, this becomes more and more difficult, and the
inconsistency of my position-that I am going to great efforts to resist
the determined actions of those who I claim are without fully human
agency-becomes harder to avoid.
By no means do I wish to elide the complications and difficulties
that lurk throughout this account of struggle. There are important
questions of strategy and tactics (especially as regards the use of
violence), and issues involving internal political organization (the role
of gender in anti-racist struggle, and vice-versa, for example), just to
get the list started. These are crucial issues that should be addressed.
For now, however, it is sufficient to see that this account of struggle,
which I am arguing is consistent with a full account of Hegelian
recognition, is a far cry from the treatment of struggle within the
agonistic interpretation. From a strategic perspective, for example, it
should be clear that non-violence is as much a kind of struggle in this
sense as is violence. Non-violence seeks to demonstrate the agency of
those who are taking up the struggle by thwarting "business as usual"
for the oppressors. This is as much a demonstration of agency as
fisticuffs or guerrilla war. My main concern at present is to show that
the struggle for pure recognition, inasmuch as it seeks not domination
but reciprocity, is different in kind from the understanding of struggle
that one finds in the agonistic interpretation. If I truly seek reciprocity,
I have to bear your agency in mind even as I struggle to demonstrate
my own to you.
This being said, it is also important to emphasize that the
expectations of results will be different within this interpretation of
struggle, as well. Since recognition cannot be understood as static,
what one seeks in struggle is not so much an end state of being but a
new way of being. That is, there may be clearly defined practical and
strategic goals (repeal this law, gain access to this public good, and so
on), but "recognition" as a discrete end cannot be one of them. An
understanding of pure recognition should inform any struggle, but only
as an ideal of interaction toward which one aims, never as a final
state. Indeed, as an explicit aim, a "struggle for recognition" is all but
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incoherent. What one struggles for, in other words, is reciprocity as a
way of interacting with others, and not as a state of being to achieve.
Reciprocity demands that each takes seriously the goals and interests
of the other, not such that one simply submits to the whims of the
other or demands submission from the other, but such that decisions
about action affecting the other are subject to negotiation and shared
decision-making between moral equals.
Hegel refers to this reciprocity of pure recognition as the "third
moment," wherein the abstractions of pure universality and pure
particularity are reconciled. The following quote from the Philosophy of
Right addresses this point by raising an important example:
The third moment is that "I" is with itself in its limitation, in this
other; as it determines itself, it nevertheless still remains with
itself and does not cease to hold fast to the universal. This,
then, is the concrete concept of freedom, whereas the two
previous moments have been found to be thoroughly abstract
and one-sided. But we already possess this freedom in the form
of feeling, for example in friendship and love. Here, we are not
one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with
reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this
limitation as ourselves. In this determinacy, the human being
should not feel determined; on the contrary, he attains his selfawareness only by regarding the other as other. Thus, freedom
lies neither in indeterminacy nor in determinacy, but is both at
once.40
Hegel's use of examples here is crucial. When he seeks individual
exemplars of pure recognition, he turns not to struggles and battles to
the death, but to friendship and love. If recognition truly is
fundamentally agonistic, then friendship and love should themselves
be either impossible, or simply mislabeled manifestations of
dominance and subordination. It is clear, however, that Hegel, at
least, does not understand them in this way. The real model of
Hegelian recognition, therefore, is not the battle to the death and the
master/slave dialectic, but rather relationships of friendship and love.
Hegel's own examples also help to make clear this point about
recognition as a way of being rather than a state of being. Friendship
is never an end state to be accomplished. Genuine friendship
(understood in a more or less Aristotelian sense),41 demands constant
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attention and nurturing from both parties. This is because each
continues to grow as individuals, which changes the nature of the
friendship, and because the friendship itself impacts the development
of the individuals. If two people are truly friends, they are in fact
always seeking to better know the other and themselves through the
friendship itself, in order to keep that friendship alive. The same is true
with love. Love demands constant nurturing and flexibility in order to
survive as love―it is never a "task" that can be accomplished, but is
rather a way of relating to another that must be constantly reaffirmed
by both parties. Pure recognition―reciprocity―should be understood in
precisely the same way, even on the political level. The goal of
struggle is not some altered manifestation of domination and
oppression, but a relation between agents and groups of agents that
will be seeking ever greater manifestations of reciprocity through an
ever-evolving relationship that demands the constant (often critical)
attention and affirmation of both parties. This becomes even more
clear if we bear in mind Hegel's understanding of "self-consciousness"
as an organizing principle for the unfolding of "Spirit" (and
recognition). To self-consciously undertake something (like reciprocal
recognition) means that one can never simply rest on one's proverbial
laurels, but must constantly scrutinize oneself, and consequently one's
relations with others.

Concluding Remarks
Hegelian recognition is not about constant combat directed
toward establishing one's dominance over another, or resisting
attempts to be dominated by the other. Nor is it about demanding or
compelling the conferral of recognition upon oneself. If this were so,
then Hegelian recognition would indeed be worthy of rejection as a
tool for theorizing human oppression and liberation. But in fact,
Hegelian recognition is about the constant effort, on the individual
level, to establish and maintain relationships of reciprocity that are
freely given and freely accepted. On the larger social/political level,
recognition is about the effort (and often, but not necessarily, the
struggle) to establish conditions that are conducive to relationships of
reciprocity. It is never a fait accompli but requires constant attention,
affirmation, and revision.
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To be sure, this is an ideal, and it is an open question whether it
is ever in fact capable of realization either on the individual or the
social levels. I submit, however, that recognition remains an important
and useful conceptual tool even if it is an ideal that may only be
approached asymptotically. Even if perfectly pure recognition is
beyond the hope of mere humans, there remains a huge difference
between varying degrees of corrupted recognition, such that the ideal
can remain an important organizing and guiding principle, and most
importantly, one that can have real practical impact on our political
practice. Holding to the ideal of reciprocal recognition provides one
with critical tools for evaluating organizational structure, modes of
individual interactions, forms of communication, and so on. At the
same time, the fact that recognition is a constant process, and not a
state to be achieved, stresses the extent to which constant vigilance
and re-assessment of our attitudes and practices is important not
merely for practical reasons, but also because it is itself a part of
reciprocity (freely recognizing one as an agent means understanding
that we are constantly growing, changing, and developing, and
therefore demands that we re-evaluate our relationship accordingly).
Ultimately, Hegelian recognition stands as the demand for the
freedom of all. Even if Hegel himself saw this only dimly, or perhaps
not at all (and there is ample textual evidence to support this), it
follows necessarily from any full account of recognition. The extent to
which I am able to participate in more or less pure manifestations of
recognition is directly proportional to the extent to which I am a free
human agent. When I fail to manifest pure recognition as a process or
effort to gain reciprocity, I fail to find my own freedom, since it cannot
be "given back to me" except by another free agent. By revealing the
limitations and contradictions of corrupted recognition, Hegel makes
this demand for total human freedom explicit.
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